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THE ENGEL CASE FROM A SWISS PERSPECTIVE 
F. William O'Brien* 
ON June 25, 1962, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the State of New York, by using its public school system 
to encourage recitation of a prayer during classroom hours, had 
adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with that clause of the first 
amendment, applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth 
amendment, which prohibits laws respecting an establishment of 
religion.1 The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Black 
for himself and four other Justices, is interesting in that he rests 
the Court's decision exclusively upon the establishment clause. 
In previous decisions, 2 the Court had not stated clearly that state 
action in contravention of this provision of the first amendment 
would fall under its ban even though religious freedom might 
be unimpaired. The present Court has now made this point clear 
beyond doubt.3 
In the ensuing pages, the Engel decision will be surveyed from 
the unique vantage point of the Swiss terrain. Such a study in 
comparative law hopefully facilitates an interchange of ideas 
among the peoples of various countries on how to handle com-
mon problems. For Americans, the experience of the Swiss with 
problems in the area of church-state relations would seem to be 
of unusual value. Switzerland is a country with a long history of 
various types of state churches. To this day established religions 
exist in most of its cantons. Nonetheless, the cantonal constitu-
tions as well as that of the Swiss Confederation are replete with 
• Professeur de Droit Constitutionnel, Universite de Fribourg, Fribourg, Suisse; for-
merly at Georgetown University.-Ed. 
1 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
2 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where the Court first "incorporated" 
the establishment clause, religious freedom was the major issue. In Mccollum v. 
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the question of religious liberty was not pressed and 
the Court's opinion is cloudy, but it appears that the Court perceived at least some 
element of restraint. As for Mrs. McCollum's original position, see Mccollum v. Board 
of Educ., 396 Ill. 14, 23, 71 N.E.2d 161, 165 (1947); Records of the Proceedings of the 
Circuit Court of Champaign County 190-216, 231. These records demonstrate clearly 
that she did not claim an infringement of religious freedom. Like many others, Mr. 
Justice Reed pointed out the lack of clarity in the opinions of his brethren on the 
bench, stating: "I find it difficult to extract from the opinions any conclusion as to 
what it is in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional." McCollum v. Board of Educ., 
333 U.S. 203, 240 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
3 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas stated explicitly 
that "there is no element of compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation." Id. 
at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Stewart wrote that "the Court does not 
hold, nor could it, that New York has interfered with the free exercise of anybody's 
religion." Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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clauses protecting religious liberty. And the manner in which 
the Swiss guard religious freedom while maintaining officially es-
tablished churches should prove of interest to American students 
of the Engel decision. An additional reason recommending the 
present study is that the political institutions of Switzerland and 
the democratic instincts of its citizens are remarkably similar to 
those characteristic of the Anglo-American tradition.4 Deserving 
special notice is the federal structure of its government, which was 
adopted in 1848 after a careful examination of the features of the 
federal system established by the Constitution of the United States. 
For many others who have discussed the Engel case, to pray 
or not to pray-that is the question. For this writer, the prime 
question is one involving the nature of federalism. The decision 
not to provide for public prayers in certain schools where religious 
tensions are high and where agreement on formula is difficult 
would indeed be the better part of wisdom. But the question of 
who should make this decision, and upon what grounds, is of the 
greatest importance. In discussing the willingness of the Supreme 
Court to accept this responsibility in analogous circumstances, 
Professor Corwin wrote prophetically in 1948 that "this may in 
the long run prove to be its [the case's] most important phase."u 
In this regard, a study of how the problems presented in Engel 
v. Vitale would be disposed of in Switzerland, within the frame-
work of its federal system of government, and with its emphasis on 
democracy and liberty, notwithstanding the multitude of official 
churches in its cantons, should prove enlightening.6 
4 BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 327 (1921); CODDING, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
SWITZERLAND 55 (1961); MooRE, MODERN CoNsrITUTIONS 241 (1957). 
5 Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 
9 (1948). 
6 This article does not concern itself with the mass of historical events responsible 
for these various church-state arrangements. Nor does it include in its compass the 
many philosophical and theological traditions which conditioned them. Those interested 
in ascertaining similarities between the Swiss and the American traditions may find 
satisfaction in comparing the theocracy founded by John Calvin in Geneva in 1536 with 
the early New England theocracies, directly traceable to Calvin's influence. In referring 
to the American experience, this author prescinds from why or how religious establish-
ments or separation happened to exist in the various states in 1789. The article treats 
solely the provisions written into the Constitution in response to the factual situation 
then obtaining. Readers who care to deal with the enormously complicated study of the 
theological and philosophical thought that went into-and came out of-these church-
state arrangements in the two countries are referred to the following, inter alia: ANDER-
SON, JACOBSON'S DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 1-71 (2d ed. 1960); 
BEARD, BASIC H1sroRY OF THE UNITED STAT.ES 14-23- (1944); 3 DIERAUER, HISTOIRE DE LA 
CONFEDERATION DE LA SUISSE 17-651 (1910); 5 id. 738-935; GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT passim (1940); PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN 
THOUGHT (1930); Morison, The Puritan Tradition, in UNDERsrANDING THE AMERICAN PAST 
67-79 (Saveth ed. 1954); Bridenbaugh, The Virginians, in id. 80-93. 
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In Switzerland the word "establishment" is found neither in 
the federal constitution nor in the constitution of any of the 
twenty-five cantons and half-cantons. Nonetheless, students of 
Swiss institutions agree that the majority of cantons do have offi-
cially established churches.7 Practically, the central government 
can recognize no one particular religion, but the federal consti-
tution guarantees to the cantons the right to maintain their own 
state churches or to introduce "separation" should they desire. 
This guarantee is found in article 3 which provides: "The 
Cantons are sovereign as far as their sovereignty is not limited by 
the Federal Constitution, and as such they exercise all the rights 
which are not delegated to the federal power.''8 
It was by virtue of this provision that the highest federal or-
gans with jurisdiction in the matter have ruled that the central 
government may make no laws respecting the establishment of 
religion in the cantons. In I 878 the Conseil Federal, the federal 
executive body, consisting of seven members, elected by the Na-
tional Assembly, held: "The Cantons have, by the Federal Con-
stitution, the power to regulate as they judge proper the external 
relations between the State and the different churches existing on 
their territory ... .''9 In 1929 the Tribunal Federal-the "Su-
preme Court" of Switzerland-stated explicitly that there was no 
prohibition in the Constitution against the establishment of state 
churches by the cantons and that this did not as such violate re-
ligious liberty.10 All authorities admit that this power flows di-
rectly from cantonal sovereignty as protected from federal invasion 
by article 3. A renowned scholar included this remark in an 
address at the University of Lausanne in 1962: 
"The principle of our federal state is to reserve to its mem-
bers, the cantons, sovereignty in those domains where power 
ought to be held as close as possible to one's person and con-
science. These sacredly reserved domains are: that of public 
education, that of church-state relations, that of the minority 
tongues."11 
7 CODDING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 53; HUGHES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SwITZER-
L\ND 63 (1954). 
8 Note the similarity of the language of the tenth amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the 
people." 
o FEUILLE Ftni:RALE IV, 404 (1878) [hereinafter cited as F.F.]. The Conseil Federal 
hears many appeals which in the United States would go to the courts. 
10 Romisch-Katholiche Kirchgemeinde Buren v. Regierungsrat Solthum, REcuEIL 
OrFICIEL DES .Arutt-rs DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 55, I, 113, 129 (1929). 
11 Address of Professor Gonzague de Reynold, printed in Fribourg's La Liberte, 
Aug. 1, 1962, p. 1, col. 2. 
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George Sauser-Hall, whose book Guide Politique Suisse is a vade 
mecum in Switzerland, has written: 
"Thus the cantons have the power to regulate as they please 
the relations of the churches with the State .... Most of the 
Swiss cantons have adopted the system of State Churches where 
the State recognizes that one or several Churches are those 
of the majority of its inhabitants. It organizes these Churches, 
subsidizes them or maintains them completely, and accords 
them certain privileges which it refuses to the other faiths. 
The official Churches thus bear the name of national 
Churches. This is the system which is in effect in most of 
the Protestant cantons and in a great number of the Catholic 
cantons."12 
Enough has now been said to suggest that, if a situation such 
as that presented in the Engel case arose in Switzerland, the 
grounds for solution would be quite different from that upon 
which the Supreme Court rested its decision. But, although the 
"establishment" argument could not be invoked, there are several 
other provisions in the Swiss federal constitution that are relevant. 
Article 27 provides, in paragraph three, that "the public schools 
shall be such that they may be attended by adherents of all re-
ligious sects without any offense to their freedom of conscience 
or belief." Paragraphs one and two of article 49 stipulate: "Free-
dom of conscience and belief is inviolable. . . . No one may be 
compelled to be a member of a religious association, to receive 
a religious education, to take part in a religious ceremony, or to 
suffer punishment of any sort by reason of religious opinion." 
Before considering how the above guarantees would be applied 
to a set of facts such as those presented in the Engel case, it is 
interesting to note that the Swiss courts are totally excluded from 
handling questions regarding the operation of the public school 
system. Article 125 of the Federal Law on Organization of the 
Judiciary provides that appeals from the cantons on questions 
involving paragraphs two and three of article 27 must be made 
to the Conseil Federal. Article 132 provides for appeals to the 
Assembly from decisions of the Conseil Federal. It should be 
noted here that the Tribunal Federal does not possess the power 
of judicial review and therefore it cannot nullify acts of the other 
organs of the central government.13 Nor does any cantonal court, 
12 SAUSER-HALL, GumE PoLlTIQUE SmssE 136-37 (16th ed. 1955). 
1a In 1939 an attempt by popular initiative to invest the Tribunal Federal with 
such authority was decisively turned back. CODDING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 112; SAUSER• 
HALL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 164. 
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save that of Geneva, exercise this prerogative vis-a-vis its executive 
or legislative departments. Thus, irrespective of what other con-
stitutional provisions may be involved, the question is foreclosed 
to decision by the judiciary if it concerns the schools. The Conseil 
Federal stated, in 1888: 
"One can only maintain that in reserving to the Conseil Fe-
deral recognition of appeals under Article 27 of the Federal 
Constitution, the Federal Law on Organization of the Judi-
ciary desired to entrust it with the judging of all appeals 
whatsoever on school affairs whatsoever be the constitutional 
provision which is violated."14 
But even the Conseil Federal and the Assembly enjoy only limited 
authority in school matters. Article 27 speaks only of "primary 
schools," and, consequently, secondary and university education 
is exclusively under the control of the cantons.15 Six of the seven 
universities in Switzerland are designated as Protestant, inasmuch 
as their faculties of theology are Protestant. The seventh has a 
Catholic faculty of theology. No one would ever contest the right 
of the cantons so to organize their universities.16 On their right 
to establish secondary schools without regard to the demands of 
article 27, the Conseil Federal ruled in 1877 that "secondary edu-
cation is entirely under the power of the cantons. . . . Conse-
quently, we have declared that the appeal is groundless in that 
which concerns the points dealing with Article 27, paragraphs 
two and three, of the Federal Constitution."17 This ruling was 
reiterated in 1897 in a case which involved the establishment of 
a public secondary school under the direction of religious sisters.18 
14 F.F. III, 755 (1888). 
15 F.F. IV, 615, 648 (1897); F.F. 258 (1877); F.F. II, 84, 86 (1878). In the last case, 
the Conseil Federal allowed itself to inquire into whether the school involved was 
really a secondary school and not merely a primary school in disguise so as to escape 
the demands of article 27. Satisfied on this score, it refused to hear the substantive 
question for want of jurisdiction. 
10 How does this arrangement comport with article 4 of the Swiss Constitution, which 
reads: "All Swiss are equal before the Law"? Compare Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 
305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938), where the Supreme Court of the United States, applying the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, ruled that "the State was bound 
to furnish him (the Negro applicant] within its borders facilities for legal education sub-
stantially equal to those which the State there afforded for persons of the white race." 
(Emphasis added.) 
17 F.F. 258 (1877). Paragraph two reads: "The Cantons provide for adequate primary 
education, which shall be exclusively under the control of the civil authority. Such 
education is compulsory and, in the public schools, free." 
18 F.F. IV, 615, 648 (1896). Since paragraph three of article 27 speaks only of public 
schools, unqualifiedly, the Conseil Federal has ruled at least once that the "liberty of 
conscience" provision therein is not so restricted. F.F. II, 733 (1882). See also Marti, 
Liberte de Croyance et des Cultes, in FICHE JURIDIQUE SUISSE 1071, at 3 (1950). 
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In speaking of the jurisdiction of the Confederation in school 
matters, it should be pointed out that the Conseil Federal has only 
the indirect power of surveillance activated in individual cases 
which come by way of appeal. Paragraph four of article 27 states 
that "the confederation shall take the necessary measures against 
Cantons which fail to fulfill these obligations [ mentioned in para-
graphs one through three]." Judging that this permitted the cen-
tral government to legislate for the schools, the Assembly in 1882 
authorized an official examination of education policies and prac-
tices in the cantons, preparatory to the subsequent enactment of 
enforcement laws.19 But, fearful of this first step into jealously 
guarded territory, the Swiss people seized a constitutional weapon 
afforded them in the optional referendum provided by article 121, 
and defeated the decree of the Assembly by popular vote.20 This 
ended efforts at direct federal control. 
Enough has now been said concerning the restricted jurisdic-
tion of the Confederation in school matters to consider the an-
swers which would be given in Switzerland to plaintiffs with griev-
ances such as those alleged in Engel v. Vitale. At the outset, it 
can safely be said that in most, if not in all, Swiss schools religious 
instruction is given; in a very large number of schools, prayers 
are recited. The following constitutes a mere sampling from a 
few cantons. 
The public schools in the Protestant canton of Vaud, where 
the National Evangelical Reformed Church is designated as the 
state religion in article 13 of the cantonal constitution, give re-
ligious instruction in accordance with article 18 of its constitution, 
19 5 SALIS, LE DROIT FEDERAL SUISSE 598-610 (1907). In his report on the need for 
such federal laws, the Chief of the Department of the Interior made the following 
remarks: "Indeed, if the Confederation is not able to have the orders it gives carried 
out, if need be by force, it were better not to give those orders, which can only weaken 
its authority when unfulfilled. . • • It can hardly think seriously of decreeing penal 
prescriptions against the unconstitutional conduct of a school teacher, when, for instance, 
if he expresses himself, from a religious point of view, in an aggressive manner offending 
liberty of conscience and belief. No more can it send troops, as a form of punishment, 
into a canton or commune on the grounds that the demands of Article 27 are not being 
observed, especially if the dispute has its source in the domain of religion and faith. 
But, even supposing that the Confederation were able, in a given case, to achieve its 
ends by coercion, it would have to ask itself, at the outset, if the evil which results from 
violence inflicted on an entire population would not be more considerable than the evil 
which it desires to remedy. In school questions, as a general thesis, . • • not much is 
gained by force." Id. at 601. The department chief concluded that the best means to 
awaken laggard cantons to their constitutional responsibilities would be enlightened public 
opinion plus the nudge of federal subsidies. Id. at 602. But when the subsidy law of 
1903 was passed, it guaranteed that francs would not be used as a means of coercion. 
Accordingly, the cantons dispense their federal stipends as they please. 4 REcuEIL 
SYsrEMATIQUE DES LOIS ET ORDONNANCES 9 (art. V) (1848-1947). 
20 HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 28. 
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which provides: "In the public schools, religious instruction ought 
to be conformed to the principles of Christianity and distinct from 
other branches of learning."21 A special school law provides that 
"school is opened by a prayer or by a hymn, or by a reading or 
in any other educational manner, after which the instructor lists 
immediately the absences in the school registry."22 In Geneva, 
the one canton in which complete separation of church and state 
is said to prevail,23 religious instruction is permitted according 
to article 137 of its constitution.24 The constitution of the Prot-
estant canton of Neuchatel contains, in article 71, the following 
provision: "Religious instruction is given freely in the public 
schools under the care of the recognized Churches; for this pur-
pose, the local schools are furnished gratuitously and favorable 
hours are reserved." In article I 7 of the constitution of the can-
ton of Fribourg, in which Catholics account for eighty-seven per-
cent of the population, there is a stipulation that the schools shall 
be "organized with a religious and patriotic direction," and that 
"in this matter there be effective co-operation assured to the 
clergy." In accordance with these provisions, Bible instruction 
is offered, generally by a layman on the ordinary faculty, and 
church doctrine is taught by the Protestant pastor or by the Cath-
olic cure.25 The official Introduction au Plan d'Etudes for Fri-
bourg schools is silent as to matters relating to religious instruc-
tion, in contrast to the official manual used for the Vaud schools 
which details the aims and contents of the course in religion and 
Bible.26 This silence is attributable to the theory that, although 
the state should cooperate with religious groups, the churches 
themselves should be entirely free as to their teaching as well as 
to their own internal organization. Prayers are said in the Fri-
bourg schools, but participation is purely optional, and discretion 
21 This religion course is detailed in the official PLAN D'ETUDES ET INSTRUCTIONS 
GENERALES POUR LES EcoLES ENFANTINES ET LES EcoLES PRIMAIRES DU CANTON DE VAUD 18-21 
(1960). Participation in the course is completely optional. 
22 RiGLEMENT ScoLAIRE art. 281. Confirmed by letter to this writer, Aug. 6, 1962, 
from Le Chef du Service de l'Enseignement Primaire, Lausanne, Vaud. 
23 SAUSER-HALL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 164. 
24 Also by article 18 de la loi sur !'instruction publique (Nov. 6, 1940). This article 
provides that the instruction is to be optional and that the department of education is 
to take steps to facilitate its organization. In a letter to this writer, the Secretary General 
of the Department of Education said that "Aucune priere de caractere religieux n'est 
recitce ou autorisee dans les classes." Letter of Sept. 3, 1962, Geneve. Likewise in the 
canton of Neuchiitel, there is no provision made for prayers. Letter to this writer from 
Le Chef du Departement de !'Instruction Publique, Aug. 30, 1962, Neuchiitel. 
25 Confirmed in interviews with the Fribourg Minister of Public Instruction, July 18 
and Sept. 19, 1962. 
20 See note 21 supra. 
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as to what formula is used is left to the individual teacher or 
principal.27 
Article 6 of the federal constitution requires that the consti-
tutions of the cantons and any amendments added thereto must 
be approved by the Confederation. The same article stipulates 
that approval should be given only if they "contain nothing con-
trary to the provisions of the Federal Constitution." Article 85, 
section 7, and article 102, sections 3 and 4, state that the two 
legislative bodies and the executive are the competent and neces-
sary organs of government for awarding this "guarantee" or sanc-
tion. 
Thus, as is evident, no one could press a suit on the ground 
that any of the several provisions in those cantonal constitutions 
mentioned above are unconstitutional on their face. In the United 
States this clearly could be done as a result of the holdings in 
Engel v. Vitale28 and McCollum v. Board of Education.29 Should 
someone in Switzerland urge that such provisions either consti-
tute an establishment of religion or are inconsistent with separa-
tion of church and state, he would be told, first, that the Assem-
bly as well as the Conseil Federal-the body hearing his appeal-
had already approved the challenged provisions and, second, that 
the Conseil Federal had foreclosed the question by interpreting 
the "sovereignty" clause of article 3 so as to guarantee to the can-
tons the right to maintain state churches.30 It would then be 
necessary to attack the provision, law, or practice by alleging that 
its application in the concrete case violated one of the "freedom 
of religion and conscience" clauses in the federal constitution. 
The following decisions of the Conseil Federal are pertinent, 
even though the factual situation in none parallels exactly that 
presented in Engel. 
An 1887 ruling stated that a Catholic father could not be 
compelled to send his Catholic daughter to the class in religion 
given in the public primary school which she regularly attended.31 
School authorities had argued that since the parent was not being 
asked to send his child to the Protestant instruction, but only to 
classes in her own faith, there was no possibility that conscience 
or belief would be violated. But the Conseil Federal rebutted 
this, asserting that paragraphs one, two and three of article 49 
27 It is usually "the Lord's Prayer, or some other such prayer which could not possibly 
offend any group." Interviews referred to in note 25 supra. See also note 44 infra. 
28 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
29 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
so See ,materials cited in notes 9-12 supra. 
31 F.F. IV, 83 (1887). 
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were all infringed by such a demand; the father's authority over 
the religious education of his children under sixteen was absolute, 
and the state had no right to inquire into one's secret motives in 
this area. "If the State [canton] wants to provide for religious 
instruction in its schools and establishments of learning, it may 
do so only if it makes it absolutely optional."32 On the other hand, 
if parents freely register their children for an optional religion 
course, then the children must attend. Thus, the Conseil Federal 
has upheld a fine imposed upon a father who permitted his child 
to skip classes in religion; the man retained the right to withdraw 
the child, but until he did so proper ordre scolaire could not 
countenance merely casual attendance.33 
In another decision, the Conseil Federal held that article 49 
was infringed by public school authorities when they wrote on 
the school certificate of a student that he "had been very negligent 
in the fulfillment of his religious duties."34 It also has ruled that, 
even if the teaching is "non-confessional," the public schools can-
not make it obligatory.35 Does Bible history come under such a 
ban? This raises a highly interesting question of a substantive 
and jurisdictional nature. In 1891, the Conseil Federal-the 
only organ authorized to hear appeals in school matters-made a 
distinction: paragraphs one through three of article 49, it said, 
justified the demand made for exempting public school children 
from school prayers, religious exercises and catechism instruction, 
but not for excusing them from the class in Bible history.36 How-
s2 Id. at 88. But, in 1930, the Tribunal Federal was presented with this case: a child 
was handed over to the guardianship of the canton of Geneva, after her parents had been 
stripped of their parental rights. The teacher in the state institution, to which the child 
was entrusted, continued to raise her in the faith of her parents, with their consent. 
Subsequently they protested against this religious education, but the Tribunal Federal 
rejected their appeal on the ground that the guardian now had the parental right in 
education. Meeting an additional protest, it said: "As to the argument drawn from the 
fact that the young Irene was placed in a State establishment whose essence is to be 
neutral in the matter of religion, the supervising authority could not restrain it. . • • 
In a desire to apply this principle, the conclusion would be reached that a child 
placed in an establishment of this kind should not receive any religious education, a 
thing in itself contrary to the neutrality of the state, and this even in opposition to the 
will of parents. This is inadmissible." Lany v. Geneve, 53 LA SEMAINE JUDICIAIRE 138, 141 
(1930). Not reported in Feuille Federate. 
33 F.F. I, 474 (1893); F.F. II, 334 (1888); F.F. IV, 92 (1887). 
34 F.F. II, 733 (1882). 
35 F.F. II, 630 (1880). 
1 
36 F.F. II, 349, 552 (1892); F.F. II, 286, 290-91 (1891). Bible study was here judged to 
be a course in history. In 1962 a lower federal court in the United States held unconstitu-
tional a Pennsylvania statute providing for the reading, without comment, of ten verses 
from the Bible in school. Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa.), prob. 
Juris. noted, 371 U.S. 807 (1962). This, unlike the Swiss cases, is not a Bible study case. 
Rather, the reading of the verses upon the opening of each class day seems similar to 
the reciting of the prayer in the Engel case, except, of course, that no state official in 
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ever, It IS the Tribunal Federal which has jurisdiction over ap-
peals involving paragraph six of article 49.37 This states that "no 
one is obliged to pay taxes devoted especially to the special ex-
penses of a ritual of a religious community to which he does 
not belong." In a case involving this paragraph, the Tribunal 
Federal declared it could not sustain the above distinction pre-
viously made by the Conseil Federal.38 Accordingly, it would 
seem that a taxpayer may refuse to pay taxes for the purchase 
of Bible history books, but that his child might be compelled to 
attend the Bible history class.39 Article 27, paragraph three, pro-
vides that "the public schools shall be such that they may be at-
tended by adherents of all religious sects without any offense to 
their freedom of conscience or belief." Nonetheless, a student 
may be compelled to take military training at school, since article 
49, paragraph five, stipulates that "no one is released from per-
formance of his civil duties by reason of his religious beliefs."40 
In some communes, religious sisters are hired to teach in the 
public primary schools. It has been argued before the Conseil 
Federal that their very presence in the classroom, in distinctive 
garb and with refined and modest comportment, makes them ef-
fective propagandists for a particular faith; and, moreover, that 
their own beliefs would inevitably penetrate even their courses 
in secular subjects.41 The Conseil Federal, while admitting the 
strong possibility of these allegations, nonetheless dismissed the 
appeal, which, it said, was based on "apprehensions" rather than 
on "real tangible facts" that religious conscience was put in 
jeopardy in the public schools. Only in the face of proof to the 
contrary in a concrete case would the federal authority have the 
right to intervene.42 In another similar case the Conseil Federal 
Pennsylvania has composed the ten Bible verses selected for reading. See text at and 
notes 21-22 supra for the law in the canton of Vaud on this practice in the public schools. 
37 Lor FEDERALE D'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE, Arts. 84(a), 125, 126(a) (1943). 
ss REcuEIL OFFICIEL DES .Arutt-rs DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL XXIII, 1361, 1369 (1897). Note 
that the case did not involve the school as such, i.e., its organization or course of studies, 
but only a taxpayer. See note 42 infra. 
39 Today this seems highly theoretical. From the school programs surveyed for the 
present study, and from interviews made, this writer concludes that the cantonal author-
ities are most solicitous not to compel a child to attend any kind of a religious or Bible 
history class. 
40 F.F. II, 86 (1878). Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
41 F.F. I, 411 (1880). 
42 In this case, as in the "Bible" cases treated above, there arose the question of 
whether the appellants could be compelled to pay taxes for the teachers' salaries. The 
Conseil Federal contended that this was under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal Federal. 
Id. at 430. The latter never ruled on the point. The practical interpretation today is 
that article 49 permits the hiring of religious sisters as teachers-as long as they are 
not administrators of the school-and the paying of their salaries with tax money. 
Interview with the Fribourg Minister of Public Education, Sept. 19, 1962. 
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stressed the point that article 27 aimed at eliminating teaching 
which infringed religious liberty, not persons who might possibly 
do so.43 
Although prayers are said in the public schools in many can-
tons, the practice never appears to have provoked parents to ask for 
a ruling on the matter from the federal authorities.44 However, the 
principles set forth in the several cases cited above are clear indica-
tions as to how the Conseil Federal would rule were an appeal made 
from the action of a school board of one of the cantons in authoriz-
ing a practice similar to that condemned in Engel v. Vitale. These 
principles, as well as those invoked by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in similar cases, will be seen in an interesting light 
if one takes a synoptic view of the pertinent constitutional history 
of the two countries. 
When the American Constitution was drafted in 1789, it con-
tained few restrictions on the states relative to the laws they might 
pass in the area of civil and personal liberties. The Bill of Rights, 
adopted in 1791, was clearly meant to bind the central govern-
ment only.45 It is interesting that, among the several proposed 
amendments which Madison presented to Congress in 1789, one 
provided: "No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or 
the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."46 
Congress rejected even this limited interference with the states' 
authority in religious matters. But at the same time it approved 
the amendment which forbade Congress to: (I) establish a 
national religion, (2) disestablish state churches, and (3) curtail 
the free exercise of religion. Thus, as late as 1845, and for many 
years thereafter, the prevailing doctrine was that set down by 
the Supreme Court in Permoli v. Municipality of New Orleans: 
"The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens 
of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to 
the state constitutions and laws."47 
43 F.F. II, 84 (1878). 
44 In Vaud and in Fribourg where prayers are said in the public schools, it is not 
clear whether the school authorities authorize a definite formula to be used. See notes 
21-22, 27 supra. In the Engel case the school board had directed one particular prayer 
to be recited, and this fact seems to have been the principal cause for the Court's adverse 
decision. 370 U.S. at 425. Does the decision permit prayers if chosen democrati-
cally by the children by majority vote or if the selection is made by the teachers? In 
the latter case, clearly it would be an agent of the state that would "impose" the prayer. 
In the former situation, the teacher would certainly have to sanction the students' choice, 
eliminate prayers clearly offensive, and ultimately "impose" the prayer thus "authorized" 
on an unwilling minority. 
45 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833). 
46 ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 249; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 450 (1834) [1789-1791]. 
47 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845). 
1080 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
The original Swiss Constitution, as it came from the hands of 
its creators in 1848, was, in pertinent part, similar,48 except that 
it armed the federal government somewhat more effectively for 
action against cantonal laws restricting religious liberty. Article 
48 thus read: "All the cantons are obliged to treat the citizens 
of one of the other States of the Confederation as citizens of 
their own State, in the matter of law and in all that concerns 
juridic procedure."49 Article 41-without the several qualifying 
paragraphs-stipulated: "The Confederation guarantees to every 
Swiss of one of the Christian confessions, the right to settle freely 
throughout the whole extent of Swiss territory, in conformity 
with the following dispositions .... "50 (These "dispositions" are 
here omitted.) Article 44 stated that "the free exercise of worship 
for the recognized Christian religions is guaranteed throughout 
the Confederation."51 Such power of intervention into the states' 
affairs was never entrusted to the federal government by the draft-
ers of the American Constitution nor by those who ratified the 
Bill of Rights. However, the more explicit guarantees now in-
cluded in articles 27 and 49 of the present Swiss Constitution were 
not included in the 1848 document. It was not until the revision 
of 1874 that the Constitution authorized the central government 
to intervene in school matters and in the general area of church-
state relations if the cantons should infringe freedom of conscience 
and belief. 52 
48 The "sovereignty" clause in article 3, like the tenth amendment, encompasses by 
implication the right to establish state churches. This right was spelled out in explicit 
Iangnage in the first amendment to the American Constitution; that is, one of the 
principal motives of those demanding the "respecting" clause was a desire to obtain 
a guarantee that the states could continue to legislate freely in the church-state area. 
The debates in the state ratifying conventions in 1788 are clear on this point. James 
Iredell of North Carolina (a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 1790-1799) seems to have sum-
marized the aspirations of most delegates who addressed themselves to the matter: "Each 
state must be left to the operation of its own principles." 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 244 (Elliott ed. 1861). See 
also I id. 44, 80, 87, 100, 114, 118, 362; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 431-42, 450, 600-65, 729, 730 
(1834) [1789-1791]. 
49 See note 51 infra. This guarantee is now in articles 60 and 61. 
50 This "freedom of movement" or "freedom of settlement" guarantee is now in 
article 45, with the religion qualification omitted, and with certain other changes. Be• 
cause of the many exceptions and because the cantons and the communes still retain 
considerable authority in the matter, the freedom granted in article 45 is much less 
complete than in the United States. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
51 Note the similarity between articles 44 and 45 and the "full faith and credit" 
clause and the "privileges and immunities" clause in article IV of the American Constitu• 
tion. For an interpretation of the latter, see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
36 (1875); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
52 For a history of the revision, see RAPPARD, LA CONSTITUTION FEDERALE DE LA 
SUISSE 1848-1948, at 271-89 (1948); RAPPARD, L'INDIVIDU ET L'ETAT (1936). For a discussion 
of the addition of article 49, see CLERC, LEs PRINCIPES DE LA LIBERTE RELIGIEUSE EN DROIT 
PUBLIC SUISSE 1-62 (1937). Article 50, added in 1874, grants freedom of worship to all. 
Thus the restriction in article 44 of the 1848 Constitution no longer exists. 
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Almost contemporaneously, the fourteenth amendment was 
added to the American Constitution, which, like the above-men-
tioned revisions in the Swiss Constitution, empowered the federal 
government to protect individuals in the states against abuses of 
authority by their state or local governments.53 An additional strik-
ing parallel will appear if section 5 of this amendment54 is juxta-
posed with the final paragraphs of articles 27 and 49 of the Swiss 
Constitution. 55 In each instance, the wording strongly suggests 
that legislation by the appropriate branches of the respective 
countries' governments was envisaged as the proper initial step 
toward implementation of the constitutional "freedom" guaran-
tees. However, in neither country has such a legislative achieve-
ment been realized.56 Thus, in Switzerland, enforcement of the 
guarantees against non-complying cantons can be demanded only 
after an appeal either to the Conseil Federal or to the Tribunal 
Federal57 by some aggrieved individual. In the United States, even 
without implementing legislation, the federal courts regularly en-
tertain such appeals, and, if need be, bequeath enforcement duties 
to the executive.58 
A final point, one of transcendent importance, concerns "estab-
lishment" vis-a-vis the "freedom" guarantees in the two constitu-
tions here under scrutiny. The federal constitution of Switzerland, 
as the above discussion indicates, is replete with detailed "liberty" 
provisions which concern the schools and the churches. But it 
does not prohibit the cantons from establishing official state reli-
gions. On the contrary, the "sovereignty" article guarantees to 
them the right to maintain a union between state and church;59 
and, by reason of the same guarantee, the Confederation is for-
bidden to establish a national church. As mentioned previously,60 
the Constitution of the United States originally presented an 
53 The pertinent part of the fourteenth amendment reads: "No state may make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deny to any person life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." 
54 "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the above 
provisions of this Amendment." 
65 Article 27, paragraph four: "The Confederation will take the necessary measures 
against cantons which fail to fulfill these obligations." Article 49, paragraph six, sentence 
two: "The exact execution of this principle is reserved to federal legislation." 
56 See note 19 supra. 
57 Depending upon the type of case. See notes 14, 37, 38, and 42 supra, and accom-
panying text. 
58 Supreme Court decisions are the "supreme law of the land," and article II 
states that the President "shall see that the laws are faithfully observed." 
59 See notes 9-12, 26 supra, and accompanying text. 
60 See notes 45-48 supra. 
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exact parallel to that of Switzerland in this regard. To what ex-
tent was the fourteenth amendment designed to rearrange this 
reservation of power? With reference to this amendment, the 
Supreme Court stated in 1922: "The Constitution of the United 
States imposes upon the States no obligation to confer upon those 
within their jurisdiction either the right of free speech or the 
right of silence."61 This language was, of course, meant to en-
compass all the guarantees in the Bill of Rights; nor was this 
interpretation novel, as previous decisions testify.62 Subsequently, 
however, the Court has held that, by reason of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, all the guarantees of the 
first amendment are constitutionally protected against action by 
the states. 63 
Since the Court itself has rejected complete "incorporation,"64 
constitutional historians may find themselves somewhat uneasy 
over the theory of "selective assimilation."65 It must, indeed, be 
61 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922). See also id. at 543. 
62 Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 327 (1868); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (1868) is particularly 
pertinent, since the sole question in that case concerned a religious matter. Moreover, 
New Hampshire had approved the fourteenth amendment in July 1866, and it became 
part of the Constitution just five months before the Hale decision. Nonetheless, there is 
not a single reference to this amendment, even in the 143-page opinion of the dissenting 
judge who supported the heterodox minister. The majority opinion of 83 pages 
mentioned the first amendment only once, and then to prove that "the whole power 
over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments." Id. at 124. 
63 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 
(1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
64 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947). 
65 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). As regards the "assimilation" or "in-
corporation" theory, the following discussion may prove helpful. The original Constitu-
tion did not-except in a few instances-authorize the federal government to protect 
the personal liberty of an individual against abuses by his state government. Nor did 
the Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791, change this arrangement, since it related only to 
action by the federal government. But the fourteenth amendment was intended to bring 
the individual definitely under the protective arm of the central government's power. 
Some have argued that its purpose was to make all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
binding upon the states. However, the majority of the Supreme Court has consistently 
held that only "selected" guarantees are made applicable under tl1e fourteenth amend• 
ment, specifically by the due process clause. Accordingly, over the years, the Court has 
"assimilated" or "incorporated" by this "selective" process only those liberties or rights 
which it has deemed to be most basic or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 
Thus, it has held that all the freedoms of the first amendment, being fundamental 
freedoms, will be protected against state infringement by the federal government. On 
the other hand, the right to a trial by jury in a criminal case need not be offered by 
the states, since it is not considered to be of so basic a character. In other words, a fair 
trial can be had and justice and liberty preserved even if jury trials are not provided. 
The experience of other highly civilized and democratic nations prove this point, and 
the Court has indicated clearly in several opinions that it takes such experience into 
account when applying the principle of "selective assimilation." But liberty could not 
Iona endure if the states denied freedom of speech, as history both remote and near so 
tragically demonstrates. Thus, it is the quality of each guarantee in the Bill of Rights 
which the Court examines before determining whether the state governments must 
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admitted that historians can amass convincing arguments against 
any incorporation. 00 The thrust of logic is equally forceful: in-
corporate all the freedoms of the Bill of Rights or incorporate 
none. What the drafters of the fourteenth amendment really in-
tended, and what the states thought they had ratified, are ques-
tions that probably will never be answered with complete satis-
faction. Nonetheless, the Palko case opinion of Mr. Justice 
Cardozo does seem to grasp the general spirit of the era and to 
capture the hopes and aspirations of the people at that time.67 
Fortunately, these thorny problems which concern the assimila-
tion of the liberty clauses of the first eight amendments need not 
be touched in this study. But the establishment clause is most 
pertinent here, and the questions relating to its assimilation must 
be considered. Since that clause does not in itself contain a "free-
dom" provision, 68 and since religious establishments can and do 
exist without infringement of religious liberty, there would ap-
pear to be no logical reason whatsoever for its incorporation into 
the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, several competent con-
stitutional Ia-wyers have urged that the Court abandon the assimila-
tion of this provision of the first amendment, 69 and further elabo-
ration of this crucial point seems desirable. Since the Court has 
rejected the theory of "complete incorporation," the states are not 
bound by any particular provision of the Bill of Rights unless 
failure to abide by such provision would be a denial of "liberty 
without due process of law." Moreover, the freedom involved, 
the Court has held, must be a basic freedom, that is, one "implicit 
extend it to its people. Proponents of "total incorporation" would make every one of 
the guarantees applicable regardless of its relative value in the scheme of ordered liberty. 
On this general matter, see, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Twining v. 
New Jersey, 2ll U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). See also notes 62 
and 63 supra. 
oo Professor Stanley Morrison concluded that there was an "absence of any adequate 
support for the incorporation theory." Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment In-
corporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. R.Ev. 140, 173 (1949). 
07 Professor Charles Fairman, who rejects the theory of complete incorporation, has 
written this of the Palko decision: "Cardozo's gloss on the due process clause ... comes 
as close as one can to catching the vague aspirations that were hung upon the privileges 
and immunities clause." Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill 
of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. R.Ev. 5, 139 (1949). 
68 To this writer it seems appropriate to note that the constitutions of Russia, 
Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Outer Mongolia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia all 
carry "separation" or "non-establishment" provisions. This underscores the fact that 
such provfaions do not in themselves secure religious freedom, especially where govern-
ments are actively attempting to destroy any established religion. 
oo See, e.g., Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 19 (1949); Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 497 (1942); Kauper, The First Ten Amendments, 37 A.B.A.J. 717 (1951); Note, 
67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1016 (1954). 
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in the concept of ordered liberty,"70 before it qualifies for incor-
poration. The guarantee of religious freedom clearly fits within 
this definition. But in Engel v. Vitale the Supreme Court seem-
ingly decided that states are forbidden to engage in any practice 
which the Court determines to be contrary to the establish-
ment clause, even if the practice should leave religious freedom 
unimpaired.71 Thus, it appears that the Court is now justifying 
the incorporation of the non-establishment provision without ref-
erence to the "ordered liberty" principle, which, nonetheless, is 
the only justification which its majority has accepted for assimilat-
ing any clause of the Bill of Rights. 
Turning to Switzerland, there at least seventeen cantons have 
state religions, and the other cantons all authorize practices, such 
as religious instruction or prayers in the public schools, which the 
Supreme Court of the United States has forbidden in America. 
England has a national church, and the Lutheran Church is 
established in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. 
The people in these countries would be surprised, probably quite 
indignant, if informed that, according to the Supreme Court's 
formula, all of these practices and church-state arrangements are 
in themselves contrary to what is "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty." Yet, the logic of the Engel decision, read in the 
light of the Palko principle, seemingly compels such a conclusion. 
The chink in the Court's armor will be further exposed by 
reflection upon this not impossible situation: If in America one 
state or one community were to decide by unanimous vote to per-
mit prayers and religious instruction in its public schools, would 
the state or community be flouting the Engel ruling? Would it 
be acting contrary to what is "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty"? If so, it is fair to ask, what concept and whose liberty? 
Assuming that all the school money involved came exclusively 
from the state or community, there would be no aggrieved person 
to carry a legal suit to the courts. Nonetheless, would not the 
practice be contrary to the supreme law of the land as now inter-
preted by the Court? Even without orders from the judiciary, 
would not the state or community be bound in conscience to per-
form a heroic act of collective self-abnegation, and to abandon 
such school programs? Of course, this action would deny freedom 
to one hundred percent of the people (in the case of this hypo-
thetical), but such sacrifice would be compelled by the principle 
70 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
71 See note 3 supra. 
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that somehow a basic concept of "ordered liberty" has been com-
promised. It is the opinion of this writer that these questions are 
appropriate and do help to underscore the weakness in the Engel 
decision. 
It would seem, then, that to be· logical and to maintain con-
sistency in constitutional principles, the Court should retreat from 
the position it has taken, and base its decisions in state cases in-
volving religious matters solely on the freedom clause of the first 
amendment. As to this present study in comparative law, it is 
interesting to note that adoption of this approach would restore 
the exact parallel-as concerns religious matters-between the 
present federal constitution of Switzerland and that of the United 
States prior to the latter-day incorporation of the non-establish-
ment principle. That is, the federal government in each country 
would continue to be the final arbiter in disputes regarding reli-
gious freedom and the guardian of the religious liberty of all in-
dividuals within the states or cantons. It would, however, refrain 
from interfering with a multitude of possible experiments in 
church-state cooperation, which judges may not like or might 
even deem attributes of religious establishments, but which recom-
mend themselves to the people as likely solutions to disturbing 
problems in a disturbed and changing world. In Switzerland, as 
indicated above, most cantons do have official churches. Although 
the Swiss people seem convinced that such arrangements enlarge 
rather than shrink religious liberty, there is little likelihood that 
the American states would or ever should follow the Swiss in this 
regard, even if they were released from federal control in the 
matter; their own state constitutions stand as barriers against such 
eventuality. 
If these suggestions as to incorporation were accepted, what 
would be the practical effect in such cases as Engel v. Vitale and 
Mccollum v. Board of Education? First, for plaintiffs in these 
cases, once the "wall" argument was removed, they would have to 
take a firm position on the only piece of constitutional terrain left 
to them-that provided by the freedom clause of the first amend-
ment. This would force. all parties in a dispute to focus their at-
tention more sharply on the only issue of religious freedom which 
is central to the whole problem. Secondly, abandonment of in-
corporation of the establishment clause would free the Court from 
"the tyranny of a label"72 which frequently results in preoccupa-
72 Mr. Justice Cardozo once observed that "a fertile source of perversion in Con-
stitutional theory is the tyranny of labels." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 
(1934). In a later case, he wrote: "The tyranny of labels ••. must not lead us to leap 
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tion with a mere abstraction while promoting inattention to ques-
tions of substantial justice in the concrete.73 In the past, social 
justice and economic freedom for the American people were 
victims of such unrealistic conceptualism on the part of the judi-
ciary. 74 The present Supreme Court seems equally in bondage to 
conceptual thinking.75 The American people are currently beset 
by serious problems in areas where education and religion meet. 
The Court lends them no aid in solving these problems, nor is the 
Court itself "responsibly aided by the uncritical invocation of met-
aphors like 'the wall of separation.' " 16 
to a conclusion that a word which in one set of facts may stand for oppression or 
enormity is of like effect in every other." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
This quotation seems particularly applicable to the word "establishment." 
73 A comment of Professor Freund is apposite: "If the Court has on the whole been 
more successful in finding serviceable accommodations under the Commerce Clause be-
tween a national free market and the claims of local welfare than under the First 
Amendment between liberty of the mind and the claims of public order, one reason 
may be the more empiric, particularistic approach that has generally characterized the 
performance of the former role." Freund, Foreword: The Year of the Steel Case, 66 
HARV. L. REv. 89, 97 (1952). 
74 For instance, the aphorism "freedom of contract," which, as applied by past Courts, 
meant actually a denial of freedom to millions of workers. Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905). Likewise, the sophism "the power to tax is the power to destroy." In 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall 
said that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." Subsequent Courts interpreted 
this as "the power to tax is the power to destroy," and then, by a doctrinaire application, 
built up a monstrous intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine relating to both state 
and federal government. This dried up revenue resources, threw an added burden on 
ta.'>'.payers, and often put private business at an unjust disadvantage with certain govern-
ment enterprises. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone tried for years to get the Court 
to look at the facts in each case before deciding whether or not the tax actually destroyed. 
The power to legislate also involves the power to destroy, but the function of courts 
and of democratic institutions is to see that no particular law does in fact destroy. Mr. 
Justice Holmes observed, "[T]he power to tax is not the power to destroy while this 
Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). The Court finally abandoned the sophistic truism in Graves v. New York 
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). 
75 In addition to the metaphor "a wall of separation,'' the "three pence only" argu-
ment of Mr. Justice Black seems like another manifestation of unrealistic thinking. Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 436. It is true that a person might possibly, in some countries and 
in some eras, be forced to conform ultimately to a religious establishment by "the 
same authority" that ta.'>'.ed him, in the beginning, "three pence only." But the facts 
are that, in America, such religious coercion has not followed, even though ever since 
1789 the federal government has been "forcing" people to contribute ta.x money for 
chaplains, for prayers, and for chapels. If Holmes were alive, perhaps bis sense of 
realism would prompt him to say "neither prayer nor pence will force religious con-
formity while this Court sits." See note 74 supra. See notes 42, 43 supra, and accompany-
ing text, for examples of how authorities in Switzerland examine the facts of each case 
in true Holmesian fashion rather than apply some general doctrinaire formula. 
76 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
